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survey, in less than thirty pages, World War I, the 1920s, the Great Depression, and World War II. Adas then slows down to cover half a century in the final 190 pages, divided into three chapters. The first examines the invention and deployment of modernization theory, notably the ideas of W. W. Rostow, in the Cold War, noting its similarities at many points to the communist alternative. The second looks at the failure of US technological systems to win the Vietnam War, either in the guise of development projects of the early years or, later, through the policy of escalating strategic bombing. The third studies the attempt to engineer dominance in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Adas argues that in the 1991 war, “technologies supplanted humans as the heroes in the victory” (360), further increasing the “technocentrism” of the military and of foreign policy. Americans became ever more (mistakenly) certain that cybertech warfare was surgically precise, while they de-emphasized the constructive, nation-building side of America’s mission as it had been conceived a century earlier, notably in the Philippines.

What is left out of this account? There is little on American aid to Europe after 1918 and after 1945, or on the reconstruction of Japan after its surrender. The Marshall Plan is not even indexed, and the Peace Corps is not discussed. Can US aid programs and the World Bank be easily dismissed, as misguided backers of large-scale, high-tech projects? Should the Philippines and Panama disappear almost entirely from the text after c. 1920? Why focus mostly on Asia, largely omitting Africa? Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico are almost invisible, South America, absent. Including all these would bloat the book, but effective uses of technologies in US foreign policy seem under-represented. Adas is also largely silent about overseas strategies of US corporations such as the major airlines, Ford, Kodak, IBM, Boeing, and Microsoft, nor does he ponder the reasons for or the results of the successful export of the American MBA as a form of managerial education. These and many other topics deserve further study in light of *Dominance By Design*. Based on the examples selected, however, Adas makes a strong case for the proposition that a self-contradictory technological ideology has long been a pervasive, and often pernicious, element of American foreign policy, from early contacts with Native Americans to the present. This timely and provocative work deserves readers beyond the academy, particularly in Washington.

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Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History. By Peter Fritzsche (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2004. pp. 268. \$27.95).

Starting point as well as result of this inspiring book is the abrupt beginning of modern times around 1800. In line with other narratives told since the days of Danton, the author emphasizes the great “rupture” caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era. But his focus is not on political and economical

processes that made “modernity” but on the notion of a “modern time” itself, i.e. on fundamental changes in the concepts of and the feelings toward the nature of time and history (for the sake of simplicity I shall here call this a change in “mentality”).

The phase of upheavals and wars between 1789 and 1815 ushered into the disconnection of past, present and future. Following Reinhardt Koselleck, Fritzsche argues that the certainty of former concepts of a more or less predictable course of history had vanished. Neither could the future be derived from the present, nor was the present a continuation of the past. The present destroyed the past. This had ambiguous consequences: History was perceived as a process of permanent losses, causing feelings of melancholy, or nostalgia, respectively. Since the structures and the people of former times were so different from those of the present, history lost its function as *magistra vitae*. But it gained new capacities making it more important than ever: it allowed for “imaginative journeys backward in time” thus helping to build “subjecthood” in respect to “both the nation and the individual”. (p.7)

With a good eye for the telling detail the emergence of a new historical knowledge and a new use of history around 1800 are displayed in five chapters. First, the French Revolution is portrayed as the big upheaval, not comparable to any other revolution. Great politics begun to affect the lives and thinking of every single European (and so created not only national identities but also a European space of shared categories). Second, the notions of refugees and other foes of the revolution are regarded from the aspect of the general homelessness in modernity. Third, the new estimation and function of ruins are discussed, in particular the romantic gaze on the banks of the Rhine, making this region an all European heritage and at the same time a mnemotope of the German identity. The following chapters widen the re-definition of the past onto literature, brother Grimm’s fairy tales etc. Fritzsche regards the new historical thinking and the new emotional quality of history as a trait of the “West”, and takes his sources from France, England, America, and Germany. Emphasis is laid on the latter where the romantic spirit was especially strong. However, as the author rightly insists, national peculiarities are not as “important as the common endeavour to think historically and to possess the past.” (S.10)

All this is bound together in an elegant and convincing manner. Alas, sometimes the main arguments are presented all too convincingly to my taste, e.g. by means of repetition and omission. Already the very start of the book provokes some concern in this respect. In the “early 1800s” we sit in a train compartment together with Joseph von Eichendorff, a leading poet of romanticism. He mocks his fellow passengers who were unable to grasp the aesthetic and moral value of a castle ruin appearing beneath the window pane. A telling introduction into the key phase around 1800—apart from the fact that there were no railways at that time (the given source, a fragment by Eichendorff, stems from the mid 19th c.). More serious objections concern the theoretical framework. The author draws e.g. on Michel Foucault, who spoke of a sudden historization in the way people “gaze” at the world, but does not discuss that this *rupture* from “similarity” to “genealogy” occurred in the decades before the French Revolution—not its consequence but possibly a precondition. In this connection it is indicative that Rousseau—who made the term “romantic” popular—is ignored completely; we

do not learn about his view on the tragic nature of the civilizing process causing tremendous “losses” and that Rousseau’s *oeuvre*—together with that of his opponent Voltaire—had an enormous impact on the revolutionaries. This leads to the question how a socio-political *caesura* could engender a shift in deep routed mental structures, or to use the terms of Braudel: why should we assume that in the case of the French Revolution the “surface” formed the “longue durée”? An answer given here—and verified by numerous citations—is that the contemporaries were very aware of the fundamental break in the *conditio humana* around 1800. However, *permanent* change in combination with the perception of the present as an *incomparably* changing time is part and parcel of modernity. Already during the Reformation people felt the order was turning upside down (“the world is bottomless, money governs everything,” as an Anabaptist put it). The French Revolution bore many elements of modern thinking as well as of traditional chiliarism; although certainly a watershed in history, its marked singularity is only part of the truth and so is its claimed role as a cause in history.

The book deals with “our invention and possession of the past” (p. 1). The talk of “invention” is popular with historians; an empty phrase—what has *not* been invented once?—to signal that something new has occurred. But the assertion of a fundamental novelty remains daring—at least in cultural and especially in intellectual history. From my own studies on the emergence of tourism as a time travel (which to my delight have a great deal in common with Fritzsche’s findings) I learned to handle the word “new” with care. Convincingly the author shows the spread and formation of a romantic, nostalgic, melancholic mentality from 1800 onward. But he falls silent when it comes to the discourses before. That the disappointment with *la terreur* and the French occupation led to romanticism is a widely held in the histories of politics, arts, and literature. However, I would suggest regarding enlightenment and romanticism as twins rather than as sequenced movements. At times one is prevalent, at times the other. Both they were embedded in the very same “modern” notion of time and history, expressing opposing intellectual and emotional attitudes toward this notion. Inspired by Freud, Norbert Elias mentions somewhere that these opposing attitudes are usually mixed in many ways; this is exactly what the deep ambiguity of modern mentality is about. The approach that emphasizes subsequent, completely different conceptions of the world, instead of two linked, simultaneous ones, cannot grasp this phenomenon. Therefore, to add a last point, Fritzsche believes that it has been only since the French Revolution that history has extended “the concept of contemporaneity across the entire globe” and so prepared the ground for providing “all people with political power” (p. 217)—as if there had been no idea of a universal “progress” aiming at a globalized “humanity” which has been challenged *after* 1800: In the wake of the romantic tide historicism—which is as far as I see not mentioned in the book—rejected the universal “philosophy of history” à la Voltaire as a mere construct, preaching the singularity and incomparability of epochs and cultures. It was historicism that separated the past from the present on theoretical grounds (since there were no inherent laws in history). Instead of making good use of this support for his arguments, Peter Fritzsche offers a rather misleading political praise of the

romantic-historicistic conception. But whatsoever—my questions and suggestions only underline how inspiring *Stranded in the Present* is: a brilliant study on the history of the making of remembrance and of our feelings toward the past.

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Hasso Spode

On Foot: A History of Walking. By Joseph A. Amato (New York: New York University Press, 2004. 333 pp.).

In the fall semester, 2006, I directed two projects studying the relationship between pedestrian behavior and vehicles over time in the city of Pittsburgh. We studied walking patterns, including issues such as the paths of pedestrians, their walking behavior, and the design of the built environment, and how these factors could bring them into high-risk situations in regard to vehicles. The library and the Internet provide many data bases and studies of themes concerning pedestrian behavior and walking today, but very little of it is historical material. Thus, Joseph Amato's monograph, *On Foot: A History of Walking*, provides a valuable background treatise for the enlightenment of students who more often prefer to drive their automobiles than walk for any trip that ranges more than a few blocks!

Amato's book ranges far back into human history and discusses from primarily a social history perspective the shift from walking as a necessary activity to walking as a matter of choice for most in the developed world and certainly in the United States. He explores who walked and why they walked, sprinkling his text with cases of famous walkers such as Thoreau who walked because he didn't like riding and Victor Hugo, a "love-stuck *bipède*." Amato explores these issues in different locations and in regard to different groups, noting how cities and the built environment provided different and varied environments and challenges for walkers than did rural pathways. To the pleasure of the reader, he scatters his text with pithy stories and comments: everywhere on Western streets, "walkers were bullied" from the beginning of World I to the end of World War II (227); the "shoe and tennis shoe industries" have grown, but society considers "not having to walk both a goal and an achievement" (231); "sitting" wins its battle over walking because of the 19th century industrial revolution (233); and, the suburbs in contemporary America have reduced walking, but suburban shopping malls have become "a new walking and talking haven for those isolated by suburban and city life (250)." Today, he notes, walking has become a commodity but it remains at the heart of "human life and movement (278)."

From my perspective, Amato's book is especially valuable for its chapters on city walking, the impact of the automobile ("the car has made the walker feel like a trespasser on the earth," 253), and the social and cultural changes in the meaning of walking. Thus, Joseph Amato continues to publish books on topics that are important to human life but often "off the beaten path." I consider it a